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The most common method for assessing similarities and differences between conscious
and unconscious processing is to compare the effects of unconscious (perceptually weak)
stimuli, with conscious (perceptually strong) stimuli. Awareness of these stimuli is then
assessed by objective performance on prime identiﬁcation tasks. While this approach
has proven extremely fruitful in furthering our understanding of unconscious cognition,
it also suffers from some critical problems. We present an alternative methodology for
comparing conscious and unconscious cognition. We used a priming version of a Stroop
paradigm and after each trial, participants gave a subjective rating of the degree to
which they were aware of the prime. Based on this trial-by-trial awareness assessment,
conscious, uncertain, and unconscious trials were separated. Crucially, in all these
conditions, the primes have identical perceptual strength. Signiﬁcant primingwas observed
for all conditions, but the effects for conscious trials were signiﬁcantly stronger, and no
difference was observed between uncertain and unconscious trials. Thus, awareness
of the prime has a large impact on congruency effects, even when signal strength is
controlled for.
Keywords: conscious processing, unconscious processing, prime awareness, stimulus strength, awareness
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INTRODUCTION
It is now generally accepted that primes that are not consciously
perceived can nevertheless be processed by the cognitive system
at high, semantic processing levels (for a review see Van den
Bussche et al., 2009a,b; Van Opstal et al., 2010). Accumulating
evidence has demonstrated the far-reaching capabilities of uncon-
scious processing, even targeting high-level cognitive functions
such as response inhibition (e.g., van Gaal et al., 2008; Hughes
et al., 2009), task-switching (e.g., Lau and Passingham, 2006), con-
text setting (Van Opstal et al., 2011), and post-error slowing (i.e.,
remedial action to prevent future errors; Cohen et al., 2009). These
various demonstrations that unconscious processing can reach
high processing levels brings to attention the important ques-
tion whether unconscious processing has limits, and if so then
what is the speciﬁc function of consciousness (Dehaene, 2008;
Lau, 2009).
A standard procedure to test the contribution of conscious-
ness in a cognitive process is to test whether the cognitive process
can also be carried out when subjects remain unaware of the
critical stimuli. The reasoning behind this approach is straight-
forward. If an effect is selectively present with conscious stimuli,
this shows that consciousness is a prerequisite for the cognitive
process underlying the effect. Based on this simple logic, several
studies have claimed that the cognitive processes involved in the
detection of errors (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001), in the resolution
of conﬂict (Kunde, 2003; Ansorge et al., 2011), or in the adap-
tation to a critical format manipulation (Van den Bussche et al.,
2008) or a manipulation of the congruency proportions (Merikle
and Joordens, 1997) are selectively associated with conscious
processing.
Typically, researchers examine whether a certain cognitive pro-
cess can be carried out on clearly visible stimuli, and, to test
the involvement of consciousness, additionally test whether the
cognitive process can also be carried out when the stimulus
remains unconscious. In order to create unconscious condi-
tions, the critical stimuli are very brieﬂy presented and heavily
masked, which prohibits conscious processing of the stimulus.
Therefore, it is impossible for subjects to notice the pres-
ence of such stimuli. When this technique is used, subjects
are typically unaware of the stimuli. If the mask is removed,
visibility of the stimuli increases drastically. Importantly, in
addition to a sharp reduction in awareness of the critical stim-
ulus, this procedure also sharply reduces the signal strength of
the critical stimulus (Lau, 2009). Consequently, smaller effects
with masked compared to unmasked stimuli (e.g., Dehaene
et al., 2003; van Gaal et al., 2010) might just be the result
of a difference in signal strength, rather than a difference in
awareness.
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In order to conﬁrm that the manipulation of signal strength
was successful to reduce prime visibility, many experimenters col-
lect an objective measure of prime visibility. Following the main
experiment, in which the instruction is typically to classify the
targets, subjects are now asked to categorize the primes. Based on
signal detection theory, a d′ measure (Green and Swets, 1966) is
calculated based on these data, which is taken as an indication
of subjects’ sensitivity for the primes. Typically one level of the
primes is treated as signal and the other as noise. A d′ measure is
then computed as the difference between the proportion of hits
and the proportion of false alarms. In this post-hoc test, subjects
typically performworse in categorizing the stimuli when the signal
strength is severely reduced, compared towhen it is not.When sub-
jects are at chance level in categorizing heavily masked stimuli (i.e.,
d′ = 0) this is often taken as a reﬂection that subjects were unaware
of the stimuli. Although this approach has proven extremely valu-
able in furthering our understanding of unconscious cognition, it
also has some drawbacks. For example, d′ might be overestimated
because of unconscious inﬂuences on the post-experiment aware-
ness test (i.e., as shown in blind sight patients; Stoerig and Cowey,
1997, 2007; Weiskrantz, 2009) or because of perceptual learning
throughout the main experiment which is expressed in elevated
performance during the posttest (Schlaghecken et al., 2008). Alter-
natively, d′ might be underestimated due to testing condition
artifacts. Because the posttest is always administered following
the main experiment, fatigue might play an important role, and
because detecting heavily masked stimuli is much more difﬁcult
than detecting clearly visible stimuli, subjects may lose motiva-
tion throughout the posttest (Pratte and Rouder, 2009; but see
Finkbeiner, 2011 for a rebuttal). Furthermore, a sizable number
of trials is needed to assure sufﬁcient statistical power to reject the
hypothesis of d′ being larger than zero (Amihai, 2012), while in
practice, researchers tend to use fewer trials for the awareness test
than for the priming blocks.
There is a close connection between the problem of signal
strength and the problem of using a d′ obtained in a post-
experiment detection task as an index of awareness. The reduction
of d′ with masked stimuli in the posttest might just express an
overall reduction in signal strength rather than a reduction in
awareness. Consequently, the absence of an effect in the main
experiment with primes which are categorized at chance level in the
posttest might just reﬂect the necessity of sufﬁcient signal strength
to produce the effect. In a similar vein, the presence of an effect
with unconscious primes might just reﬂect an insensitivity of our
posttest d′ measure towards partial awareness of masked stimuli
(Kouider and Dupoux, 2004).
A TRIAL-BASED ASSESSMENT APPROACH
In the current study, we tried to solve this complex issue by aban-
doning both problematic constructs. Because we cannot equate
the d′ obtained in the posttest with awareness, we need another
approach to reliably classify primes as either consciously or not
consciously perceived. For example, Lau and Passingham (2006)
showed that subjective reports of stimulus awareness can vary
heavily in two conditions with a perfectly matched d′. The authors
emphasized that their ﬁndings showed that d′ is just a measure
of signal-to-noise ratio, and that the most straightforward way
to examine whether subjects are aware of a stimulus or not is to
simply ask them (Dehaene, 2008; Lau, 2009). After all, the main
determinant of awareness is the introspective judgment that we
are aware of a stimulus (Cleeremans, 2011). If we are not aware
that a stimulus was presented at all, it seems appropriate to label
this stimulus as unconscious.
Although subjective measures have not always been treated as
valuable data in cognitive sciences (Jack and Roepstorff, 2002),
or even have a problematic relation with it (Nisbett and Wil-
son, 1977), convincing evidence exists that subjects can accurately
introspect their own awareness of visual information (Corallo
et al., 2008; Marti et al., 2010). As convincingly argued by Hurl-
burt and Heavey (2001), problems associated with introspective
methods of awareness, such as the under conﬁdence phenomenon
(Björkman et al., 1993), should not be used to disapprove intro-
spection per se, but rather as a means to develop better intro-
spective measures. When using appropriate measures, such as
the perceptual awareness scale (i.e., PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard,
2004), it has been shown that subjects can exhaustively report on
their conscious experiences (Sandberg et al., 2010). Following the
suggestion to use subjective prime awareness reports on a single-
trial basis (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984; Dehaene, 2008; Lau,
2009; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011), we present a paradigm in
which awareness of the primes is not a priori speciﬁed based on
manipulating the signal strength, but rather is derived from the
subjective judgment of awareness. The aim of the current paper
is not to suggest abolishing objective prime awareness measures
or to provide a perfect measure of prime awareness, but rather to
explore alternative measures where consciousness is inferred from
introspection and where visual strength in conscious and uncon-
scious conditions is perfectly matched. This could stimulate new
insights and debate.
In our paradigm, we will present primes for the same interme-
diate duration (i.e., 40 ms) throughout the entire experiment.
Because extensive pilot testing showed that the threshold of
consciousness varies around this value, subjects will be aware
of the masked primes on some trials and unaware on others.
Because stimulus conditions are completely identical in both
situations, our paradigm allows creating conscious and uncon-
scious conditions while keeping stimulus strength constant. As
such, the paradigm can be used to reexamine a whole range of
questions (e.g., comparing conscious and unconscious priming;
comparing conscious and unconscious conﬂict adaptation). In
our study, we used a priming version of the Stroop paradigm,
in which primes are color words printed in black, and tar-
gets are colored symbols. Additionally, there are several reasons
why we chose this task over other alternatives. First, because
in our modiﬁed Stroop task primes (i.e., words) and targets
(i.e., colors) trigger the same response while being perceptu-
ally dissimilar, sensory identity priming can be ruled out as a
possible explanation of our results. Second, and most impor-
tant, a huge advantage of this perceptual dissimilarity between
prime and target is that it is much easier for subjects to judge
whether they were aware of the primes or not. If prime and tar-
get are perceptually identical, subjects often discard weak prime
information as being caused by the target (Vermeiren and Cleere-
mans, 2012). If prime information is perceptually completely
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 769 | 2
“fnhum-07-00769” — 2013/11/14 — 21:34 — page 3 — #3
Van den Bussche et al. Trial-based assessment of conscious and unconscious processing
separated from target information, as is the case in our study,
it is much clearer for subjects whether or not they were aware of
the primes.
Although a trial-by-trial prime awareness assessment has
been used before in combination with a target task, previ-
ous studies either did not use it to contrast conscious and
unconscious trials (e.g., Klotz and Neumann, 1999) or did not
match stimulus strength (e.g., Ansorge et al., 2011). Using the
trial-based assessment approach described above, we will be
able to differentiate three types of trials with matched stimulus
strength: conscious trials, where participants correctly identiﬁed
the prime and were certain of the prime identity; uncertain
trials, where participants correctly identiﬁed the prime, but
were uncertain of the prime identity; unconscious trials where
the participants reported not being able to identify the prime.
For these three conditions, we will examine whether prim-
ing effects were observed and how these effects differ between
conditions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Fifty-six students (nine male) with a mean age of 19.0 years
(SD = 1.50, range 17–25) participated as partial fulﬁlment of a
course requirement.
STIMULI
Stimuli were presented on a 75-Hz, 15′′ color screen connected
to a computer running the Windows operating system in a dimly
lit room. Stimulus delivery and the recording of reaction time
and accuracy were controlled by E-prime (www.pstnet.com; Psy-
chology Software Tools). All stimuli appeared in Arial 14 pt. The
primes, between 2.3 and 2.7 cm wide and 0.7 cm high, were
either the color word “ROOD” (“red” in Dutch) or the color
word “BLAUW” (“blue” in Dutch), presented as black upper-
case letters on a white background. The targets consisted of ﬁve
symbols (&&&&&) printed either in red or blue. This led to
four prime-target combinations (two primes x two targets). Half
of the trials were congruent (i.e., prime and target elicited the
same response) and half were incongruent (i.e., prime and target
elicited different responses). Stimulus sequences were randomly
generated.
PROCEDURE
Figure 1 depicts the sequence of a trial. All stimuli appeared in the
center of the screen. First, a forward mask ($#$#$#) was shown
for 480 ms, followed by a prime presented for 40 ms. The prime
was followed by a backward mask ($#$#$#) for 27 ms. Finally, a
targetwas presenteduntil the participants’ responsewas registered.
Before the experiment started, subjects were carefully debriefed
about the structure of the experiment, with the emphasis on the
fact that a color word (either “RED” or “BLUE”), printed in black,
will be presented before the colored symbols. They were told to
respond as fast as possible to the color of the target symbols, and
afterward to indicate whether they had seen the identity of the
prime on that trial or not.
Following their response to the target, subjects were asked to
indicate how certain they were about the identity of the colur
word prime on the current trial using a ﬁve-point PAS (Ramsøy
and Overgaard, 2004) ranging from 1 to 5: “I am certain that I saw
the color word RED: press “1” on the keyboard;”“I think I saw the
color word RED, but I am not certain: press “2” on the keyboard;”
“I did not see the color word: press “3” on the keyboard;” “I think
I saw the color word BLUE, but I am not certain: press “4” on the
keyboard;”“I am certain that I saw the color word BLUE: press ‘5’
on the keyboard.” Subjects could take as much time as needed for
this second task.
After this subjective judgment of prime awareness, subjects
were shown the instructions again, and asked to press the spacebar
when ready, which initiated the next trial. Once they pressed the
spacebar, a plus sign (+) was shown for 2000 ms, after which a
new trial started. The experiment started with 32 practice trials
on which they received feedback following each trial about their
performance on the speeded response task. Afterward, the main
experiment started. Each subject received four blocks, consisting
FIGURE 1 | Example of a congruent trial.
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of 80 trials. All presentations were synchronized with the vertical
refresh cycle of the screen (13.3 ms).
RESULTS
SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS
In a ﬁrst step, only those participants that were eligible to be
included in the analyses were selected. Three exclusion crite-
ria were used. First, in order to conduct reliable analyses, a
sufﬁcient number of trials had to be available in each of the condi-
tions under investigation (conscious, uncertain, and unconscious
condition) for each participant. To achieve this, all participants
with less than 15 trials in one or more of these conditions were
excluded (N = 16). Second, participants with a guessing strat-
egy were excluded. When participants were able to identify the
primes, the proportion of correct prime identiﬁcations should
be clearly above chance level (i.e., 50%). If the proportion of
correct prime identiﬁcations is close to chance level, this indi-
cates that the participant was guessing instead of being able to
identify the primes. Therefore, participants whose proportion
of correct prime identiﬁcations (based on scores 1, 2, 4, and
5) was below 55% were excluded (N = 2). Third, participants
who made more than 20% errors in their response to the targets
were omitted (N = 1). In total, this led to the exclusion of 19 of
the 56 participants. The ﬁnal sample consisted of 37 participants
(seven males) with a mean age of 19.0 years (SD = 1.42, range
18–24).
CONSCIOUS, UNCERTAIN, AND UNCONSCIOUS TRIALS
Looking at the proportion of correctly identiﬁed primes, it became
apparent that there was a clear difference between trials where
participants indicated being certain of the prime identity by giv-
ing a score of “1” or “5” on the PAS scale and trials where
participants indicated being uncertain of the prime identity by
giving a score of “2” or “4” on the PAS scale. More speciﬁcally,
the proportion of correctly identiﬁed primes was signiﬁcantly
higher when they were certain of the prime identity compared
to when they were uncertain [88 versus 73%, t(36) = 11.32,
p < 0.001].
For the analyses, trials where participants correctly identiﬁed
the prime and were certain of the prime identity (score “1” or “5”
on the PAS scale) were labeled as “conscious” trials. Trials where
participants correctly identiﬁed the prime, but were uncertain of
the prime identity (score “2” or “4” on the PAS scale) were labeled
as “uncertain” trials. “Unconscious trials” were labeled as those
trials where the participants reported not being able to identify
the prime (score “3” on the PAS scale). Trials where participants
reported having seen a blue prime when the prime was in fact red
(on average 8.6%) or a red prime when the prime was in fact blue
(on average 5.9%) were excluded from analyses. Because these
latter errors occurred so infrequently, no reliable analyses could be
conducted on these trials. After additionally excluding trials where
an errorwasmade on the response to the target (see below), this led
to an average of 103 conscious trials (range 17–267), 87 uncertain
trials (range 18–162), and 61 unconscious trials (range 16–199)
across subjects. Table 1 provides an overview of the number of
trials in each condition per subject.
Table 1 | Number of included trials in each condition (conscious,
uncertain, or unconscious) per subject and the overall mean.
Subject Conscious Uncertain Unconscious
1 69 73 58
2 151 95 38
3 169 34 19
4 92 113 89
5 121 19 106
6 102 104 56
7 41 81 105
8 267 19 19
9 174 38 16
10 34 101 58
11 90 104 65
12 147 104 22
13 129 127 38
14 18 137 105
15 17 70 199
16 122 74 37
17 69 102 21
18 119 84 31
19 218 45 26
20 32 136 104
21 36 98 100
22 63 104 122
23 137 18 48
24 90 85 62
25 18 112 162
26 99 162 17
27 85 55 91
28 76 129 62
29 202 34 34
30 65 140 50
31 127 126 26
32 150 79 39
33 88 114 66
34 207 30 39
35 78 63 33
36 25 111 58
37 79 116 39
Mean 103 87 61
RT ANALYSES
Erroneous responses to the target (on average 7.3%) were
excluded. Median RTs from correct responses to the target were
submitted to a repeated measures analysis with condition (con-
scious, uncertain, or unconscious) and congruency (congruent
or incongruent) as within-subject factors. Mean of median RTs
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as a function of these factors are reported in Table 2. The main
effect of congruency was signiﬁcant [F(1,36) = 41.45, p< 0.001].
On average, participants responded 74 ms slower to incongruent
than congruent trials. The main effect of condition was also sig-
niﬁcant [F(2,35) = 15.23, p < 0.001]: average RTs were 606 ms
on conscious trials, 549 ms on uncertain trials, and 575.5 ms on
unconscious trials. The factors condition and congruency signif-
icantly interacted [F(2,35) = 12.54, p < 0.001]: the observed
congruency effect (RT on incongruent trials – RT on congru-
ent trials) was signiﬁcantly different for conscious, uncertain,
and unconscious trials (respectively, 140, 48, and 33 ms). One
sample t-tests indicated that all congruency effects signiﬁcantly
differed from zero [t(36) = 7.31, p < 0.001 for conscious trials,
t(36) = 2.58, p = 0.014 for uncertain trials and t(36) = 2.05,
p = 0.048 for unconscious trials]. Paired samples t-tests indicated
that congruency effects were signiﬁcantly larger for conscious tri-
als than for uncertain [t(36) = 4.54, p < 0.001] and unconscious
trials [t(36) = 4.02, p = 0.001]. No difference was observed
between the congruency effects for uncertain and unconscious
trials [t(36) = −0.59, p = 0.56].
ERROR ANALYSES
The same repeated measures analysis was performed on mean
error rates. Mean error rates as a function of condition and con-
gruency are reported in Table 2. This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant
main effect of congruency [F(1,36) = 31.54, p< 0.001]. On aver-
age, participants made 6.1% more errors on incongruent than
congruent trials. The main effect of condition was also signiﬁcant
[F(2,35)= 21.07, p< 0.001]: average error rateswere 9.4%on con-
scious trials, 4.6% on uncertain trials and 12.0% on unconscious
trials. The factors condition and congruency signiﬁcantly inter-
acted [F(2,35)= 11.41, p< 0.001]: the observed congruency effect
(errors on incongruent trials – errors on congruent trials) was
signiﬁcantly different for conscious, uncertain and unconscious
trials (respectively, 12.6, 2.0, and 3.9%). One sample t-tests indi-
cated that the congruency effects for conscious and unconscious
trials signiﬁcantly differed from zero [respectively, t(36) = 5.30,
p < 0.001 and t(36) = 2.12, p = 0.041]. The congruency effect
Table 2 | Mean (SD) of the median RTs (in ms) and mean error rates (in
%) as a function of condition and congruency and the congruency
effects (incongruent-congruent).
Congruent Incongruent Congruency effect
Conscious
RT 536 (153.1) 676 (214.9) 140***
Error % 2.7 (3.1) 15.3 (14.1) 12.6***
Uncertain
RT 525 (151.9) 573 (221.2) 48*
Error % 3.6 (5.8) 5.6 (4.8) 2.0◦
Unconscious
RT 559 (195.2) 592 (220.4) 33*
Error % 10.1 (9.5) 14.0 (11.9) 3.9*
***p < 0.001, *p < 0.05, ◦p < 0.08.
for uncertain trials was only marginally signiﬁcant [t(36) = 1.90,
p= 0.065]. Paired samples t-tests indicated that congruency effects
were signiﬁcantly larger for conscious trials than for uncertain
[t(36) = 4.78, p < 0.001] and unconscious trials [t(36) = 2.81,
p = 0.008]. No difference was observed between the congru-
ency effects for uncertain and unconscious trials [t(36) = 0.86,
p = 0.40].
DISCUSSION
In the current study, we used a paradigm to reliably disentangle
conscious and unconscious processing based on a trial-by-trial
prime awareness assessment. In traditional masking paradigms,
unconscious primes typically have a lower signal strength than
conscious primes, confounding the comparison between con-
scious and unconscious processing. As an alternative approach,
we categorized trials with identical stimulus strength as either
conscious, uncertain, or unconscious based on the trial-by-trial
prime awareness assessment. With this paradigm, we observed
signiﬁcant priming for conscious, uncertain, and unconscious tri-
als. However, the effects for conscious trials were signiﬁcantly
stronger than the effects of the other two types. These quanti-
tative differences show that this paradigm is able to distinguish
conscious from uncertain and unconscious processing. No sig-
niﬁcant difference was observed between the uncertain trials,
where participants made correct but uncertain prime identiﬁ-
cations, and unconscious trials, where participants claimed they
did not see the primes. These results show that even when the
signal strength is kept constant, primes which are consciously
perceived cause much larger effects than primes which cause
uncertainty or even remain subjectively unconscious (Haynes
et al., 2005).
MATCHING STIMULUS STRENGTH
The problematic difference in signal strength between conscious
and unconscious trials has already received some attention in the
literature (Lau, 2009). A few studies already tried to match for dif-
ferences in signal strength, and examined the inﬂuence of this
matching on measures of awareness. For example, Lamy et al.
(2009) also presented stimuli for an intermediate duration fol-
lowed by a mask, and categorized trials as either conscious or
unconscious based on a trial-by-trial awareness measure. Using
EEG, these authors conﬁrmed the observation of previous studies
that the amplitude of the P3 was larger in the conscious compared
to the unconscious condition. Among similar lines, a few studies
matched for differences in signal strength between conscious and
unconscious conditions, when studying conscious access (Ram-
søy and Overgaard, 2004; Sergent and Dehaene, 2004; Del Cul
et al., 2007). Importantly, the crucial addition of the current
paradigm with respect to previous work is that in our paradigm
the trial-based assessment method is used to create conscious and
unconscious trials with identical signal strength, while at the same
time we are gathering information on the masked priming task. By
doing this, we can combine the trial-based visibility information
with traditional measures of cognitive processing (e.g., priming
effects). Thus, with the current paradigm we can examine whether
previous studies which observed that certain cognitive functions
require conscious processing (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001; Kunde,
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2003) were actually the result of a difference in signal strength or
not, which contributes to the study of the function of conscious-
ness. Although two recent studies have also tried to accomplish
this, theydidnot control the stimulus strength in the conscious and
unconscious conditions (Ansorge et al., 2011) or used a dichoto-
mous prime awareness measure (Ro et al., 2009) which is unable
to exhaustively measure all conscious knowledge that is available
for the subject (i.e., exhaustiveness), while excluding unconscious
knowledge (i.e., exclusiveness; Sandberg et al., 2011).
THE MAGNITUDE OF PRIMING EFFECTS IS DETERMINED BY PRIME
AWARENESS
The results of the current study directly oppose those of Francken
et al. (2011), who claimed that priming effects are independent of
prime awareness. Using either a metacontrast mask (which effec-
tively masked the primes) or a pseudo mask (which looked similar
to the former, but was inefﬁcient in masking the prime), large dif-
ferences in discriminability of the primes were observed between
these two conditions. Notwithstanding this difference in discrim-
inability, priming effects were completely identical. According to
the authors, the absence of a difference in priming effects between
both types of masks could be taken as evidence that the signal
strength was matched (Francken et al., 2011), and thus that prim-
ing effects are independent of prime awareness once signal strength
is controlled for. However, this ﬁnding was probably caused by the
fact that both masks did not render stimuli completely uncon-
scious, and that the true difference in visibility between both
masks was much smaller than the suggested difference (Desender
and Van den Bussche, 2012). In our opinion, to fully match
the signal strength of a conscious and an unconscious condi-
tion, presentation conditions should be identical in both cases,
as is the case in the current study. Only then, differences in sig-
nal strength as an underlying cause can completely be ruled out
as an alternative for differences in effects dependent on prime
awareness.
PROS AND CONS
Apart from the clear methodological improvements of the current
paradigm, a major advantage is that it can be particularly well uti-
lized in combination with brain imaging methods as it allows the
concurrent assessment of factors that inﬂuence prime awareness
and the processes involved in unconscious priming. For exam-
ple, many recent studies have focused on identifying pre-stimulus
EEG predictors of conscious recognition of a stimulus such as the
amplitude and coherence of EEG oscillations (Hanslmayr et al.,
2007) or the ongoing phase of alpha activity (Busch et al., 2009).
By combining trial-to-trial objective and subjective awareness tests
with a priming task, future studiesmay be able to determine if sim-
ilar factors predict the magnitude of priming as well as assessing
the interaction between EEG measures of both prime visibility
and priming. Such an approach could signiﬁcantly further our
understanding of how unconscious processes are implemented in
the brain, and thereby help validate or refute different theoretical
approaches to understanding consciousness.
The current paradigm also has certain drawbacks. Because of
the exclusion criteria, it requires a large number of participants
to reach sufﬁcient power. Introspective methods also give rise to
variance in the number of trials in each condition. Since the par-
ticipants themselves indicate which trials are conscious, uncertain,
and unconscious, this will differ strongly between participants (see
Table 1). In order to checkwhether this variance had a strong inﬂu-
ence on the observed priming effects, we divided the participants
in three groups based on whether their majority of trials was con-
scious, uncertain, or unconscious. There were no differences in
the RT analysis between participants with mostly conscious trials,
mostly uncertain trials and mostly unconscious trials for each of
the observed priming effects (all p > 0.39). In the error rate anal-
ysis, there was only a difference between the three groups for the
priming effect for conscious trials [F(2,34) = 6.54, p = 0.004]:
the priming effect for conscious trials was larger for participants
withmostly uncertain (20.0%)or unconscious (18.6%) trials com-
pared to participants with mostly conscious trials (4.5%). This
latter effect could be due to the fact that participants with mostly
uncertain or unconscious trials are more conservative in deciding
when a trial was truly conscious andonly do this on trials where the
prime was extremely visible for them,which could lead to stronger
priming effects. These results indicate that, although introspective
methods inherently lead to variability in the distribution of the
data, this seemed to have only a limited inﬂuence on the observed
pattern of results.
Additionally, participants probably used varying strategies to
“categorize”their phenomenological experience of the primeusing
the discrete response scale. For example, some participants might
use a higher threshold to judge a prime as “not seen” com-
pared to other participants. This can also induce variability in
the number of trials per condition across participants. In future
studies, this source of variance should be avoided, for example
by using a more continuous scale (and thus not forcing partici-
pants to judge their experience in a discrete manner; e.g., Todd
et al., 2012), by training participants on the ability to introspect
(e.g., Lutz and Thompson, 2003), or by combining a subjective
with an objective prime awareness measure. For example, in a
recent study Morsella et al. (2009) wanted to assess the subjective
experience associated with sustaining incompatible intentions. In
order to assure that all subjects introspected “the same thing,”
they were ﬁrst trained in a separate task to associate the experi-
ence associated with an incompatible event to a corresponding
response.
Furthermore, one might argue that in this paradigm the sub-
jects’ attention is drawn towards the presence of the primes.
Participants are aware of the primes from the start, which proba-
bly increases their attention to the primes and thus perhaps their
prime awareness. However, in this case the awareness level of the
primes, although heightened, always remains stable, whereas in
typicalmaskedpriming experiments participants are not informed
about the primes during the priming experiment, but only dur-
ing the post-hoc prime visibility assessment, which would lead to
a difference in the awareness of the primes at the time the prim-
ing effects are measured and at the time the prime awareness is
assessed. One could also argue that during uncertain and uncon-
scious trials participants’ degree of attention is lower (e.g., due to
mind-wandering) causing decreased priming effects. Indeed, we
did not control for effects such as mind-wandering, but this is
true for almost all traditional priming research as well. Still, future
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studies (using both traditional and trial-by-trial prime awareness
assessment) should take this into account. Another potential draw-
back is the fact that the paradigm induces a dual task context:
participants ﬁrst respond to the target and afterwards perform
a task on the prime. This creates a different task situation com-
pared to traditional priming paradigms. Although this did not
impair masked priming in the current study, it might inﬂuence the
observed results under certain circumstances (e.g., Fischer et al.,
2011). The current paradigm is also unable to disentangle the
causality of priming and prime identiﬁcation. One might argue
that, intuitively, a higher primevisibilitywill induce stronger prim-
ing effects. However, it could also be the case that trials where a
strong priming effect is present lead to some metacognitive aware-
ness (e.g., awareness of speed of RTs, awareness of the urge to
press the wrong response button, a notion of the difﬁculty of the
trial; e.g., Marti et al., 2010) and this in turn might aid prime
identiﬁcation.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that even when perfectly matching stimulus strength
in conscious and unconscious conditions based on a trial-
based assessment of prime awareness, much stronger priming
effects are observed for conscious versus unconscious or uncer-
tain trials. This method proves to be a fruitful approach to
disentangle conscious and unconscious processing. Still, more
work has to be done. Primarily, as suggested in the discus-
sion, future studies should focus on minimizing the variability
between participants which occurs when they introspect on their
phenomenological experience. We should continue to search
for ways to optimally integrate phenomenology in cognitive
science.
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